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Trade Liberalisation with Trade Induced Technical 
Change in Morocco and Egypt 
David Evans, Michael Gasiorek, Scott McDonald and Sherman Robinson1 
 
Abstract 
Recent years have seen a large increase in the number of bilateral 
preferential trade agreements, especially between developed and less 
developed economies, despite the fact that the predicted welfare gains 
are limited. Supporters of such agreements often argue that the real 
benefits of such agreements to the lesser developed economies will arise 
through trade induced productivity gains. This study examines this 
argument in the context of the proposed agreement between Morocco 
and the EU and Egypt and the EU, using a global CGE model and 
econometric estimates of the impact of trade liberalisation of total factor 
productivity in Morocco and Egypt. The results indicate that trade 
induced productivity gains can substantially enhance the benefits 
accruing to Morocco and Egypt and make an appreciable contribution to 
the reduction in poverty. However the analyses also indicate that trade 
diversion effects may have a major impact on the results; this conclusion 
is contrary to much previous evidence. 
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I.  Introduction 
Since the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the EU and the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean, referred to here as the Mediterranean and North African or MENA countries, 
have been engaged in a more active process of integration and trade liberalisation. Whereas 
prior to 1995 the relationship was primarily asymmetric, the Barcelona process envisaged 
trade relations becoming both more symmetric as well as deeper than heretofore. The context 
of these developments in the MENA countries is an explosion in the number of regional trade 
agreements in recent years. An analysis of such agreements and historical analysis of patterns 
of trade and formation of trade blocs in the post-war period suggests that RTAs can be 
categorised into three types: (1) bloc creation, (2) bloc expansion, (3) market access. (see 
Evans et al., 2006). In assessing any regional trade agreement it is important to consider the 
impact of policies and trends affecting both “shallow” and “deep” integration. “Shallow” 
integration involves the lowering or elimination of barriers to the movement of goods and 
services across national borders within the region. Within this context “negative” integration 
entails the lowering trade barriers created by national policies. In contrast “deep” integration 
involves establishing or expanding the institutional environment in order to facilitate trade 
and location of production without regard to national borders. In this context “positive” 
integration suggests policies designed to encourage trade and facilitate segmentation of 
production processes and value chains. An important component of such deep integration is 
Smithian trade induced technical change based on local scale economies and externalities (see 
Evans et al., 2006, for further details). 
The analyses reported in this paper evaluate closer economic relations between 
Morocco and the EU, and Egypt and the EU. Although these agreements are primarily market 
access agreements, they contain some elements of deep integration; accordingly the analyses 
consider the impacts of both types of integration. The primary technique used is a multi-
regional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model (Globe) (McDonald, et al., 2005), 
wherein Morocco and Egypt are separately identified regions. This method is well suited to 
the analysis of shallow integration. 
The analysis of shallow integration is conventional; the liberalisation of trade between 
partners through the elimination of tariff barriers. It is noteworthy that the FTAs considered 
are asymmetrical because EU tariffs on manufactured imports from Morocco and Egypt have 
already been eliminated whilst Morocco and Egyptian protection against EU exports of 
manufactures remain high The analysis of deep integration is more novel. The first element of 
deep integration uses econometric estimates of linkages between changes in shares of output 
traded and productivity (these are based on detailed firm level data set for Morocco and 
sectoral data for Egypt and are reported in Gasiorek et al., 2005 and 2006). These estimates 
are used in consort with the Globe CGE model to derive estimates of the impact of changes in 
tariffs upon trade flows between Morocco and Egypt and the EU, and consequent trade-
induced technical change arising from FTA’s with the EU. In the case of Morocco, the 
available data also allowed direct estimates of poverty impacts. The second element of deep 
integration considered arose from regulatory harmonisation; this was captured by notional 
increases in export supply elasticities for Egypt and Morocco, and import demand elasticities 
for the EU. 
The econometric findings on productivity and trade policy reform emphasise the 
richness of the estimation at the micro firm-level data. The results suggest a positive 
relationship between exports and trade – where the size of the coefficient depended both on 
the sector being considered, as well as the time period. The impacts of shallow integration are 
small welfare gains for Morocco and Egypt, with substantive reductions in poverty for 
Morocco. These gains are substantially increased by the forces of deep integration. However, 
the results also provide evidence of some trade diversion in Morocco, and strong trade 
diversion in Egypt, at base levels of MFN tariffs. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section contains a brief summary 
of some the general research findings about RTAs and contrasts these with results for Egypt. 
In the third section the CGE model and data are described, along with some descriptive 
statistics. This is followed by a details of the experiments run and then in section 5 by a 
discussion of the results. The final section offers some concluding comments. 
CGE Modelling of RTAs and the MENA countries 
A survey of over 100 computable general equilibrium (CGE) model studies of RTAs 
established in the last 15 or so years by Robinson and Thierfelder (2003) found overwhelming 
evidence that trade creation dominates trade diversion. Broadly speaking, the studies were of 
multi country RTA’s facilitating shallow integration arising from the removal of barriers to 
trade in commodities. Changes in trade barriers affecting services were usually outside of the 
RTA’s studied or outside the analyses with CGE models considered. In Egypt, several authors 
have used CGE models for the analysis of Egypt’s regional trading relationships using static 
and dynamic, single and multi-country models of MENA countries, but not including specific 
modelling of Egypt’s major trading partners such as the USA and the EU. This rich Egyptian 
literature has been surveyed recently by El-Said (2005). The findings of the static CGE 
models on Egypt’s regional trading relations in the 1990s do not always support the general 
finding of Robinson and Thierfelder, that for shallow integration, trade creation dominates 
trade diversion. For example, Hoekman and Konan (1999) find that shallow integration under 
the EU-Egypt Agreement produces net trade diversion with negative welfare effects 
indicating some trade diversion. Hoekman and Konan also extended the analysis of shallow 
integration to include deep integration where trade barriers in services are removed and 
efficiency benefits of liberalisation of domestic and foreign capital in services are considered, 
producing extremely large welfare gains (see also Konan and Kim (2004)). Thus, the CGE 
studies for RTA’s involving Egypt do not fit into the pattern found by Robinson and 
Thierfelder for many-country RTAs. 
Compared with the welfare benefits of shallow integration for goods trade, these studies 
show an estimated benefit from deep integration of well over 10% of GDP. The economic 
mechanism that produces this very large result are the  high estimated initial barriers to trade 
in services and liberalisation of both domestic and foreign investment in services that has 
large efficiency effects without any net new foreign investment. It is difficult to tell how 
plausible the findings on services liberalisation are without stronger micro empirical evidence. 
The estimated efficiency gains to services from the removal of barriers to services trade are 
highly speculative and the suggested benefits from lilberalisation of domestic and foreign 
investment without new capital inflows seems somewhat high. 
The Globe CGE Model and Data 
The study uses an application of the (comparative static) Globe computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model (see McDonald et al., 2005) to the MENA region. The Globe 
model is a multi region descendant of the single country/region CGE model described by 
Dervis, et al., (1982), and its subsequent development as reported by Robinson et al., (1990) 
and Kilkenny (1991). The properties of this type of model are well known, and hence the 
description here is limited. The multi region formulation is a development of a model first 
developed to evaluate NAFTA (see Robinson, et al., 1993). The model is a member of the 
class of Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) based CGE models (see Pyatt, 1998), and is 
calibrated using a SAM representation of the GTAP v6 dataset for 2001 (see McDonald and 
Thierfelder, 2004). 
Globe Model 
The Globe model is, in effect, a series of single country/region CGE models that are linked by 
commodity trade. Trade is modelled following the Armington ‘insight’; namely domestically 
produced and consumed commodities are imperfect substitutes for both imports and exports. 
Import demand is modelled via a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
functions; imported commodities from different source regions are treated as imperfect 
substitutes and hence aggregated into ‘composite’ import commodities that are then imperfect 
substitutes for their counterpart domestic commodities The ‘composite’ imported 
commodities and their counterpart domestic commodities are then combined to produce 
composite consumption commodities. These are the commodities demanded by domestic 
agents as intermediate inputs and for final demand. 
Export supply is modelled via a series of nested constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) functions; the ‘composite’ export commodities are treated as imperfect substitutes for 
domestically consumed commodities, and exported commodities from a source region to 
different destination regions are treated as imperfect ‘substitutes’ for each other. Total 
domestic commodity production is an aggregation of the ‘composite’ exported commodities 
and their counterpart domestic commodities. As such this model differs from the GTAP 
model through the use of CET functions for export supply; consequently domestic producers 
adjust export supplies in response to changes the relative prices of exports and domestic 
commodities, thereby moderating the terms of trade effects in this class of model. 
The production structure is a two stage nest. Intermediate inputs are used in fixed 
proportions per unit of output– Leontief technology, while primary inputs are combined as 
imperfect substitutes, according to a CES function, to produce value added. The combination 
of aggregate value added and aggregate intermediate inputs to produce output can be by either 
Leontief or CES technology.  
Final demand by the household is modelled under the assumption that households are 
utility maximisers who respond to changes in relative prices and their incomes. The utility 
function in the model are Cobb-Douglas; this has the advantage that with a standard, 
neoclassical, set of closure rules the changes in household consumption expenditure can be 
interpreted as equivalent variations in welfare, and hence provide useful summary measures 
of the welfare effects of the policy simulations. Final demand by the government and for 
investment is modelled under the assumption that the relative quantities of each commodity 
demand by these two institutions are fixed – this reflects the absence of a clear theory that 
defines an appropriate behavioural response by these agents to changes in relative prices. The 
Globe model is formulated to allow a wide range of alternative closure rules; the alternatives 
used in this study are defined below when the policy experiments are specified. 
Table 1 Value Added Shares 2001 (%) 
Activity Morocco Egypt 
Cereals 5.47 3.70 
Other crops 6.57 7.34 
Livestock 7.75 6.00 
Minerals 2.91 13.41 
Food products 2.88 2.74 
Textiles 5.80 3.13 
Other manufacturing 4.73 3.09 
Heavy manufacturing 6.64 4.46 
Electricity 2.45 0.79 
Gas and water 0.20 0.77 
Construction 5.57 4.96 
Transport and communication 21.08 23.12 
Financial and other services 27.96 26.48 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: GTAP V6 dataset for 2001 
In order to estimate the impact of trade reform experiments on poverty we follow the 
general approach presented by Lofgren et al., (2003), which assumes that there are household 
survey data available that include income sources that correspond to the income sources in the 
CGE model. Changes in factor income in the CGE model can then be translated into 
proportional changes in household incomes and then, once all household incomes are 
adjusted, distributional and poverty statistics are computed and compared with the pre-
adjustment values to see the impact of the experiment. This techniques could be used for 
Morocco, despite only having access to summary information from a household survey, but 
there was insufficient data to apply the techniques to Egypt. Using (summary) information on 
the within-group income distribution, we fit a lognormal distribution to each within-group 
distribution, and use these estimates to generate synthetic samples, which were then used to 
analyzing poverty and the distribution of income. 
Data 
The aggregation of the global SAM used to calibrate the model has nine regions and thirteen 
commodities. While Morocco is a separate region in the GTAP database, Egypt is part of the 
region “Other North Africa”, which consists of Egypt, Libya and Algeria. But Egypt 
contributes 60% GDP to this region and hence the “Egypt” experiments reported are the 
results for “Other North Africa”. 
Table 2 Tariff protection in Morocco 2001 (% tariff equivalents) 
 USA EU_15 Rest Eur Mar Tun 
Rest 
N_Afr Tur 
Rest 
M_E ROW Mea
Morocco 
Cereals 22.8 29.3 27.4 0.0 0.0 4.5 26.7 0.0 26.3 27
Other crops 10.7 23.6 20.6 0.0 24.9 10.5 29.4 21.6 23.5 22
Livestock 18.9 28.9 15.1 0.0 0.7 1.5 25.1 30.3 24.7 27
Minerals 11.9 7.0 0.9 0.0 0.8 8.1 17.6 7.0 15.5 8
Food products 28.4 47.6 35.6 0.0 25.8 14.6 52.0 24.9 28.7 35
Textiles 34.5 39.3 34.9 0.0 20.4 21.1 35.1 10.4 37.3 38
Other 
manufacturing 15.9 12.4 16.2 0.0 17.5 14.6 25.9 12.2 16.8 13
Heavy 
manufacturing 25.7 20.3 20.2 0.0 14.2 1.8 32.3 16.6 26.7 20
Electricity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Egypt 
Cereals 2.7 2.6 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.4 2
Other crops 7.4 14.7 36.6 0.9 13.3 7.8 16.3 15.0 13.5 14
Livestock 10.5 12.9 3.9 1.3 12.5 2.8 2.8 7.4 5.2 6
Minerals 3.5 9.5 3.4 20.4 7.4 11.5 14.1 2.5 3.9 4
Food products 15.3 13.0 34.1 2.9 8.5 8.6 22.6 15.8 13.3 14
Textiles 92.5 71.0 53.6 3.1 21.4 12.3 135.2 38.1 262.8 182
Other 
manufacturing 10.2 13.9 14.1 1.3 11.1 11.3 19.5 9.7 16.4 13
Heavy 
manufacturing 7.9 16.9 16.1 2.8 10.1 8.6 21.1 9.0 17.5 15
Electricity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0
Source: GTAP V6 database. 
Summary structural statistics of Morocco and Egypt are reported in Tables 1 - 4. With 
two exceptions, the structural characteristics of Morocco and “Egypt” are strikingly similar. 
Both countries have around 15% of value added in agriculture and nearly 60% in utilities, 
construction and services. The exceptions are minerals, which in “Egypt” account for a much 
large share of economic activity than Morocco, and manufactures. In Morocco, manufactures 
account for nearly 20% of value added and about 14% in “Egypt”. The much larger minerals 
sector and smaller manufacturing sector in “Egypt compared with Morocco arises in part to 
the inclusion of Libya in the aggregate Other North Africa. 
Table 3 Export and Import Shares 2001 (%) (Valued fob) 
From/to USA EU  15 
Rest 
Eur Mar Tun 
Rest 
N_Afr Tur 
Rest 
M_E ROW 
Exports 
USA 0.00 29.52 2.83 0.09 0.06 0.77 0.49 3.40 62.85 
EU_15 11.45 54.65 9.10 0.28 0.29 0.66 0.76 2.88 19.93 
Rest Eur 9.49 59.19 10.16 0.10 0.08 0.47 0.93 2.57 17.01 
Mar 9.99 59.66 3.18 0.00 0.40 0.98 0.48 2.63 22.68 
Tun 6.59 70.55 2.47 0.46 0.00 3.75 0.89 3.01 12.28 
Rest 
N_Afr 15.14 58.05 2.89 0.51 0.84 0.30 2.76 3.41 16.10 
Tur 12.15 52.05 6.77 0.24 0.37 2.28 0.00 7.44 18.70 
Rest M_E 17.48 21.15 1.48 0.41 0.07 0.54 1.33 8.45 49.08 
ROW 31.12 19.06 2.55 0.08 0.05 0.37 0.37 2.52 43.89 
Imports 
USA 0.00 23.22 2.82 0.09 0.05 0.45 0.43 2.86 70.08 
EU_15 10.53 55.27 8.77 0.27 0.26 0.87 0.91 1.73 21.40 
Rest Eur 6.79 61.81 10.12 0.10 0.06 0.29 0.80 0.81 19.23 
Mar 6.80 60.80 3.31 0.00 0.38 1.67 0.92 7.33 18.79 
Tun 5.40 72.43 2.98 0.44 0.00 3.14 1.60 1.39 12.62 
Rest 
N_Afr 17.81 43.66 4.51 0.28 0.91 0.29 2.60 2.85 27.09 
Tur 10.55 46.69 8.36 0.13 0.20 2.49 0.00 6.56 25.02 
Rest M_E 14.72 35.40 4.63 0.14 0.14 0.62 1.58 8.38 34.39 
ROW 22.62 20.34 2.54 0.10 0.05 0.24 0.33 4.04 49.73 
Source: GTAP V6 dataset 2001 
The second major difference is in the height of protection (Table 2), which is in the 
medium to high range for Morocco and “Egypt” except in Textiles. Textiles in Morocco have 
the highest rate of nominal protection at 38%, and for Egypt the average tariff is at over 
180%. In Morocco, the EU is a high cost source of imports for Other Manufactures and for 
Heaving Manufactures as reflected by the lower tariff barriers in Morocco in these sectors 
compared with other import sources. In “Egypt”, the EU is the low cost supplier of Textiles 
especially compared with the Rest of the World (i.e., East Asian suppliers). 
Another but less striking difference between Morocco and “Egypt” are the trade shares 
with the EU. The export shares are with the EU are about the same, but Morocco has a much 
higher share of imports arising from the EU (60%) compared with “Egypt” (nearly 45%) (see 
Tables 3). In comparison with the real Egypt, the composite “Egypt” has several biases. 
Compared with the real Egypt, our “Egypt” data overstates trade shares with the EU and 
overstates the height of tariffs. These biases between the real Egypt and our composite 
“Egypt” need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. These biases and the 
structural differences between “Egypt” and Morocco have an important bearing on the 
empirical results reported below. 
In addition to the transactions data from the SAM it is necessary to specify a series of 
substitution elasticities. We specify high substitution elasticities for imports from (and exports 
to) different countries/regions, which allows the model to capture trade-diversion effects from 
regional trade agreements—the focus of our work. Substitution elasticities between traded 
composites and domestic goods are in-line with estimates from other global models. 
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Model experiments 
The formulation of the experiments involves specifying both the appropriate set of closure 
rules and the appropriate set of shocks. These are dealt with in turn. 
Closure Rules 
The model contains certain conditions that must be satisfied – government account balance, 
external balance, factor market balance and savings-investment equality. These closure rules 
represent important assumptions on the way institutions operate in the economy and can 
substantively influence model results. 
• Land, Skilled Labour, Capital, and Natural Resources are assumed to be 
perfectly mobile across sectors and fully employed; hence these factor markets 
are treated as competitive, producing market-clearing wage and rental rates. This 
is also the case for Unskilled labour in the first experiment, but thereafter the 
wage rates for unskilled labour are fixed at institutionally determined rates, and 
the market is cleared from a pool of unemployed or underemployed unskilled 
labour. In 2000-2002 total unemployment in Morocco was estimated at 12% of 
the total labour force while for Egypt total unemployment was 9%.  With about 
70% of wage payments going to unskilled workers in both economies, this 
implies that unemployment amongst unskilled labour is around 16% in Morocco 
and 12% in Egypt. Hence the assumption of underemployed Unskilled labour 
appears reasonable. 
• Exchange rates are assumed to flexible for all regions with the external balance 
cleared with fixed real balances on the current account. 
• The savings-investment account is cleared by fixing the (value) share of 
investment in domestic final demand and allowing the savings rates for the 
households to adjust to clear the account. There is an interaction with the 
government and external accounts since both these accounts contribute to 
savings within a region. 
• Trade liberalisation will cause reductions in tariff revenues. In this study these 
are replaced by equiproportionate increases in factor use taxes for all factors 
except unskilled labour, which faces no factor use tax. Tariff reform will change 
commodity prices, with complex indirect impacts on income distribution, but the 
Trade Liberalisation with Trade Induced Technical Change in Morocco and Egypt 
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replacement tax on factors will have a direct, pro-poor impact, since unskilled 
workers are relatively poor. 
Shocks 
In specifying the model shocks, the preliminary econometric estimates of trade induced 
technical change had to be translated into elasticity estimates for the model. For Morocco the 
data made it possible to examine the relationship for different firm sizes, for which significant 
differences were found. The negative relationship appears to hold for small firms (less than 10 
employees), but there was a positive relationship for large firms (greater than 100 employees) 
– such that a 10% increase in openness led to an increase in productivity of roughly 4.0%. In 
the case of Egypt, the estimates of the trade induced productivity links were not as significant. 
For Egypt on the export side, strong trade - productivity elasticities of up to 4 were found. 
Using a good deal of judgement, the best estimate of the trade-productivity elasticities for 
both exports and imports in both countries were set at 0.4 for Experiment 5. 
There are 7 experiments (additional details about the experiments are provided in 
Appendix 1). In all experiments the basic shock was the same; the full elimination of bilateral 
tariffs between the EU and Morocco and the EU and Egypt. A permutation of the basic shock 
was included to allow for 33% and 67% cuts in MFN tariff rates. The trade shocks for Egypt 
were designed to capture in a stylised fashion the developments in the Egypt-EU Free Trade 
Agreement that were applied in 2004, and the MFN tariff cuts of roughly 33% that took place 
in Egypt in 2004 in fulfilment of Egypt’s Uruguay Round obligations. A second shock of an 
additional 33% cut in the MFN tariffs for Egypt are intended to capture the effects of a 
possible future MFN tariff cut for Egypt currently under discussion at the WTO. The same 
pattern of tariff cuts were applied to Morocco to capture in a stylised manner similar trade 
policy changes under way in that country. These shocks are economy-wide averages that do 
not capture the considerable sectoral and time phasing variation in the actual application of 
the trade policy changes in Egypt. Full analysis of such detail would require better data for 
Egypt and a recursive CGE model to capture the combined effects of sectoral and time 
phasing differences in the application of the 2004 trade policy changes in Egypt. 
• Experiment 1: This experiment has a standard neo-classical closure of factor 
markets, without trade induced technical change. 
• Experiment 2: This experiment assumes the existence of unemployment through 
a fixed wage for unskilled labour, so that the level of employment of unskilled 
Trade Liberalisation with Trade Induced Technical Change in Morocco and Egypt 
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labour can vary, and no induced technical change. Given the significant levels of 
unemployment in the MENA countries in the base year of over 10%, this 
specification aims to capture an important structural characteristic of both 
countries. This assumption is retained for the remaining experiments. 
• Experiments 3-6: These experiments introduce trade induced technical change 
with a range of trade-productivity elasticities. The best estimate elasticity of 0.4 
is used in experiment 5, while experiments 3 and 6 are, respectively, lower and 
upper bound elasticities and experiment 4 is an intermediate elasticity. 
• Experiment 7: This introduced a stylised representation of deep integration 
through increases in the import and export elasticities between the EU and 
Morocco and Egypt. 
The results from seven (7) experiments are reported for each FTA. While each FTA is 
considered separately there is a strong hub-and-spoke structure of MENA trade with the EU, 
so it makes little difference to the results if the FTAs are considered for each country 
separately or combined. Also, agricultural tariffs are relatively low, so the results are not 
much affected by choosing a full FTA rather than a FTA in manufactures only. 
Results 
Impact of trade policy change - Morocco 
The results for Morocco are summarised in Table 5 below. All results are shown as % 
changes over base levels. 
The upper panel of Table 5 details the results for exports, imports, GDP, absorption, 
household expenditure and real exchange rate. By choice of import and export substitution 
elasticities affecting the regional composition of trade, the international terms of trade hardly 
change in each experiment (the small country assumption holds) and are not reported. The 
middle panel shows impacts on factor incomes, headcount poverty, and the elasticity of the 
change in the headcount poverty rate with respect to percent change in total household 
income. Finally the bottom panel of the table shows the trade-induced changes in TFP 
generated by the experiments. In summary the key findings are: 
Experiment M1: The Morocco-EU FTA has a strong effect on total exports and imports 
and leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate of nearly 4%. Real GDP measured in 
base-year prices falls slightly, largely as a result of the small adverse international terms of 
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trade effect (not shown). A measure of the over-all welfare benefits of the Morocco-EU FTA 
when there is no change in foreign savings is given by the change in absorption, which equals 
GDP plus imports minus exports. There is a small increase in absorption (0.3%).  
Table 5 Experiment Results for Morocco (% changes) 
  Base M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
Exports 1.15 11.90 14.01 14.36 16.41 18.93 23.81 24.13
Imports 1.44 11.42 13.33 13.64 15.48 17.80 22.27 22.74
GDP expenditure 3.17 -0.54 1.05 1.34 2.61 3.45 4.79 4.18
Absorption 3.46 0.29 1.85 2.12 3.37 4.26 5.72 5.26
Exports + Imports for Morocco 
Global  - 12.15 14.46 14.79 16.77 19.21 23.93 24.28
FTA - 34.34 36.98 37.32 39.75 43.50 50.95 51.18
ROW - -19.84 -19.66 -19.33 -18.05 -17.58 -17.02 -16.49
Real Exchange 
Rate 1.00 3.91 3.73 3.66 3.12 -0.21 1.99 1.60
Disposable factor income 
Land 0.06 4.68 5.78 6.10 7.65 8.51 9.95 9.62
UnSkld 1.31 2.55 3.77 3.98 5.04 5.94 7.47 6.95
SkLab 0.45 -1.48 0.37 0.73 2.28 3.24 4.70 4.23
Capital 0.86 -0.55 1.39 1.69 3.06 4.01 5.57 5.07
NatRes 0.02 -8.00 -6.57 -6.26 -5.81 -8.11 -12.71 -8.90
Poverty 
Headcount poverty 19.04 -5.99 -10.29 -11.13 -13.29 -14.71 -17.44 -16.44
Elasticity poverty 
wrt income 0.00 -0.77 -0.65 -0.63 -0.46 -0.40 -0.34 -0.35
TFP 
Food 2.43 0.00 0.00 2.51 14.88 20.60 29.75 29.39
Textiles 2.37 0.00 0.00 0.25 2.24 6.02 13.61 7.89
Other Manuf 2.23 0.00 0.00 1.54 6.00 7.38 7.60 10.45
Heavy Manuf 2.10 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.9 3.0 2.1 3.0
Notes: 
1) Column 1 is the base value. Experiment columns are percent change from base, except headcount poverty, 
which is the percentage point change from the base values.  
2) The “elasticity of poverty wrt income” is the change in headcount poverty divided by the change in total 
household disposable income.  
Since over half of Morocco’s imports of manufactures are included in the FTA, one 
would expect significant trade diversion to occur. Within-FTA trade expands by 34%, while 
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trade with the rest of the world (ROW) declines by 20%. There is, however, a net increase in 
total trade for Morocco of 12%, so the FTA is net trade expanding. It is important to note that 
net trade expansion does not measure net trade creation. The cost of trade diversion is 
included within real imports less real exports and is not netted out. 
The changes in the structure of production lead to an increase in the demand for 
unskilled labour, with a resulting increase in the unskilled wage of 2.55%, and an increase in 
returns to agricultural land. While there is a slight decline in the skilled wage, the net impact 
is pro-poor. The poverty head count falls by 6%. 
Experiment M2: Experiment M2 repeats Experiment M1, except unskilled wages are 
fixed and unskilled employment can increase or decrease, depending on labour demand.  
As in Experiment M1, there is a substantial increase in overall trade, but now unskilled 
employment increases (by 3.8%) and GDP increases (by 1.1%). The result is a larger increase 
in aggregate absorption than in Experiment M1 (1.9 % compared to 0.3%).  
The changes production structure and increase in GDP lead to increases in all factor 
returns except for Natural Resources, with land and unskilled labour gaining the most. The 
result is a significantly larger reduction in head count poverty by just over 10%.  
Experiment M3: Here we now allow for trade-induced productivity changes linked to 
changes in manufacturing exports, but not linked to changes in imports. With these trade-
linked technical changes, the competitiveness of Moroccan industry increases by more than in 
the preceding experiment. The pattern of changes is overall similar to that in earlier 
experiments, but the GDP response is larger. Compared with Experiment M2, there is a small 
increase in employment of unskilled labour. There is a larger increase in exports and imports, 
a slightly smaller change in the exchange rate (in order to maintain external balance). The rise 
in aggregate absorption is also larger, due largely to the increase in GDP.  
This experiment reduces headcount poverty, but only slightly compared to Experiment 
M2. The productivity gains are shared across all factors, and the increase in employment of 
unskilled labour is small. With the fixed unskilled wage, the small increase in employment 
does not suffice to generate much more poverty reduction.  
Experiments M4 to M6: These experiments explore the impact of varying assumptions 
about the links between increased trade and productivity. Experiment M6 is the most 
dramatic, yielding very large productivity increases, especially in food and textiles. The 
results are generally larger increase in trade, GDP, employment, and absorption. The 
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employment effects lead to dramatic decreases in head count poverty, with Experiment M6 
yielding a decrease of 17.4% — the most optimistic result in all the experiments.  
Experiment M7 repeats Experiment 5, but adds assumed effects from elements of deep 
integration. The EU-Morocco FTA is assumed to lead to easier trade penetration in both 
directions, with increases in the trade substitution elasticities in Morocco between domestic 
and traded goods (both imports and exports).   
Compared to Experiment M5, the results are dramatic. Trade increases a lot (exports 
increase 24% compared to 19% in Experiment M5). Employment, GDP, and absorption all 
increase by about a percentage point more than in Experiment M5, and head count poverty 
falls by about 1.5 percentage points more.  
The results from the deep integration experiment are only slightly less beneficial than 
those from the optimistic trade-productivity link Experiment M6. These results emphasize the 
potential importance of achieving deep integration, which are also likely to be associated with 
increased trade-productivity links. There may well be a virtuous synergy between trade 
liberalisation, deep integration, and trade-productivity links. While these experiments do not 
explore such causal links, they do indicate that, if present, their impact would be large.  
Impact of trade policy change — Egypt 
In order to facilitate comparison across the results, we ran exactly the same sequence of 
experiments for Egypt, and the results are given in Table 6. The results are significantly 
different. The differences in the results stem largely from the differences in the underlying 
trade patterns of the Moroccan and Egyptian economies and the initial height of tariff 
protection. In particular, the EU is a much more important trading partner for Morocco than 
for Egypt and Egypt has a greater potential for trade diversion at the initial base MFN tariff 
levels. 
From the top panel of Table 6, import liberalisation leads to much smaller net changes 
in trade flows across all the experiments, with exports and imports increasing between 4% and 
8%, about a third of the values for Morocco. Given the very high initial protection rates in 
Egypt, the EU-Egypt FTA causes much more trade diversion than in the case of Morocco. 
The net impact on welfare is negative, with declines in GDP and absorption for the first four 
experiments. In the cases where the unskilled wage is fixed, the result is a decline in 
employment, compared to increases in Morocco. Only in Experiments E5, E6, and E7 do the 
increases in trade-induced productivity serve to offset the impact of trade diversion, leading to 
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increases in GDP. Employment only increases in Experiments E6 and E7, the most optimistic 
scenarios in the series. 
Compared with the real Egypt, our “Egypt” calculations overstate the impact of the EU-
Egypt Agreement on account of the overstated trade shares with the EU and overstate the 
potential welfare cost of trade diversion because of the overstatement of the height of tariffs. 
However, in broad terms, the EU-“Egypt” results provide a basis for a preliminary assessment 
of the relative size of impacts on welfare of the experiments E1 to E7 at the initial base MFN 
tariff levels. In a similar calculation for Egypt, Hoekman and Konan (1998, Table 3 column 
(1) also find a small negative welfare impact (- 0.14% of GDP) arising from the trade 
diversion from the Egypt-EU agreement. 
Table 6 Experiment Results for Egypt (% changes) 
  Base E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 
Exports 3.82 5.42 4.99 5.08 5.63 6.15 8.08 7.07
Imports 4.68 1.45 1.09 1.16 1.57 1.99 3.52 2.86
GDP expenditure 17.47 -0.20 -0.94 -0.74 -0.01 0.89 3.45 1.32
Absorption 18.34 -0.95 -1.66 -1.47 -0.78 0.07 2.50 0.52
Exports + Imports for Egypt 
Global  3.85 5.17 4.76 4.84 5.39 5.88 7.73 6.75
FTA 7.55 28.35 27.98 28.02 28.35 28.67 29.97 29.63
ROW 3.70 -18.99 -19.33 -19.20 -18.54 -17.77 -15.44 -17.09
Real Exchange 
Rate 0.00 6.57 6.15 6.20 6.13 6.33 6.35 6.32
Disposable factor income 
Land 0.00 -0.77 -1.20 -0.90 -0.04 1.33 4.99 2.02
UnSkld 0.00 -1.62 -2.11 -1.90 -1.06 -0.10 2.65 0.42
SkLab 0.00 -2.87 -3.60 -3.35 -2.41 -1.30 1.82 -0.73
Capital 0.00 -1.93 -2.83 -2.62 -1.73 -0.74 2.08 -0.21
NatRes 0.00 16.41 15.00 15.10 14.24 14.48 13.26 14.11
TFP 
Food 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.93 1.19 10.22 33.52 12.06
Textiles 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 11.89 17.85 44.14 23.44
Other Manuf 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 3.13 6.61 16.41 8.39
Heavy Manuf 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.77 1.63 2.76 1.64
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Thus, the results for both Morocco and Egypt on trade diversion are worst-case; because 
we have only taken into account long-run tariff changes for EU-Morocco and EU-Egypt 
which aim to reduce import tariffs to zero, by 2016 in the case of Egypt. 
MFN Tariff Cuts 
However, under the auspices of the WTO, Egypt introduced changes in the MFN tariffs of 
roughly 33% in 2004 . To develop this line of argument, we ran two modified versions of the 
E5 experiment for Morocco and Egypt, cutting the base MFN tariff by 33% and 66% 
respectively. These and a first decomposition of absorption are shown in Table 7.  
Table 7 MFN Tariff cuts and Absorption Decomposition (%changes) 
Morocco 
Experiment M2 M5 M5A M5B 
absorption 1.85 4.23 4.79 5.34 
q_domestic -0.69 1.09 1.39 1.62 
t_of_t 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.03 
exports 2.45 3.10 3.39 3.74 
Egypt 
Experiment E2 E5 E5A E5B 
absorption -1.66 0.07 1.86 5.03 
q_domestic -1.95 -0.11 1.01 2.80 
t_of_t 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.01 
exports 0.22 0.14 0.83 2.24 
Notes: M2 E2, M5 E5 as before, M5A, M5B, E5A, E5B have 33% and 66% cut in mnf tariffs. 
The 33% cut roughly corresponds to the average cut in MFN tariffs agreed under the 
auspices of the WTO in 2004. In this case, the absorption measure of welfare increased from 
0.07% to 1.86%. A further cut of the MFN tariff to 66% of the base level increased the 
absorption measure of welfare to 5.03%. These results underscore the importance for both 
Egypt and Morocco of accompanying an EU FTA with broader trade liberalisation. For Egypt 
such broader trade liberalisation, a process already taking place under the auspices of the 
WTO, appears so far to be driven by considerations relating to the speed of reduction of tariffs 
on sensitive industries, considerations already present in the differential rates of reduction of 
tariffs under the Egypt-EU Agreement, rather than economic efficiency ie removing trade 
diversion.  
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The net effect of the EU-FTA agreement and the WTO tariff cuts on trade diversion 
including transitional effects requires further study which will be greatly facilitated by the 
inclusion of Egypt proper in the GTAP dataset which will be available in the GTAP 7.0 
dataset. If the emphases on further market assess integration between Morocco and Egypt is to 
shift the balance from shallow to deep integration, how far should the MFN tariff cuts go? 
Should they stop at some benchmark such as 33% of our base 2001 tariffs, or should they be 
cut to zero? Should the MFN tariffs be cut to zero over the time horizon of the cuts in the 
FTA tariffs with the EU of 10 years, would this facilitate or hinder deep integration? 
VI. Concluding Comments 
The findings of the CGE model of the Morocco-EU FTA are of interest for several reasons: 
• Looking only at tariffs, shallow integration of Morocco into an EU-Morocco 
FTA leads to small gains for Morocco, but significant reductions in poverty.  
• Applying econometrically estimated elasticities to trade-linked technical change 
makes the FTA much more beneficial. Sensitivity analysis concerning the nature 
and size of the trade-productivity links indicates that there are great potential 
gains from an EU-Morocco FTA.  
• Further increased benefits to a Morocco-EU FTA could be achieved by deep 
integration involving removal of non-tariff barriers and by improving the quality 
and standards of domestic goods for potential export sales. 
• The impact of a EU-Egypt FTA is far less favourable than for Morocco, given 
Egypt’s very high initial levels of import protection and consequent strong trade 
diversion. Even with MFN tariffs cut by 33% as in the WTO agreements, the 
welfare improvement for Egypt from the Egypt-EU FTA is only slightly more 
than 1.Only with trade induced productivity change and elements of deep 
integration or with further cuts in the MFN tariff are the welfare gains 
significant.  
In conclusion, if initial general protection levels are high, an RTA that only achieves 
lowering of border barriers to trade (shallow integration) leads to trade diversion and a loss of 
aggregate welfare. Where the RTA partner is initially a major trading partner, and general 
protection levels are moderate, trade diversion are weaker and the RTA is beneficial. With 
trade-productivity links and benefits from deep integration, gains from trade creation are 
magnified, including distributional improvements and reduction in poverty in the case of 
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Morocco. For Egypt, only with high estimates of TFP change, deep integration measures or 
MFN tariff cuts are the negative welfare effects of trade diversion offset. There is a need for 
further research into these links to refine the econometric estimates of TFP change, and at the 
micro and economy wide level to decompose the sources of welfare change into trade 
creation/diversion effects, terms of trade effects and productivity effects. The strong policy 
conclusions are: 
• shallow integration with the EU in Morocco and Egypt risks either lower 
welfare gains or significant welfare loss through trade diversion; 
• deep integration measures such as encouraging trade induced TFP change and 
improved quality and standards for exports have strong positive welfare 
benefits; 
• to the extent that poverty effects could be measured, the combined effects of the 
Morocco FTA with the EU had strong poverty reducing benefits, in contrast 
with Egypt where overall welfare improvement and improved factor income 
distribution only came with powerful deep integration measures and further cuts 
in the MFN tariffs. 
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Appendix 1 Experiments 
 
All experiments have : 
  Exogenous: foreign savings, investment, government expenditure, government savings 
  Lost tariff revenue replaced with factor tax except on unskilled labour        
  Tariff cuts: FTA with EU_15             
Details of differentiated experiments:             
Experiments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Factor markets        
Unskilled labour neoclassical wage fixed wage fixed wage fixed wage fixed wage fixed wage fixed
other  neoclassical neoclassical neoclassical neoclassical neoclassical neoclassical neoclassica
TFP response  elasticity        
import competing        
Food products 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Textiles 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Other manufacturing 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Heavy manufacturing 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Export        
Food products 0 0 0.07 0.07 0.4 1 0.4 
Textiles 0 0 0.07 0.07 0.4 1 0.4 
Other manufacturing 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.4 1 0.4 
Heavy manufacturing 0 0 0.07 0.07 0.4 1 0.4 
Deep integration  none none none none none none yes 
EU15 imp. elasticities        
Food products 5 5 5 5 5 5 7.5 
Textiles 5 5 5 5 5 5 7.5 
Other manufacturing 5 5 5 5 5 5 7.5 
MENA export elasticities        
Food products 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.5 
Textiles 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.5 
Other manuf. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.5 
